Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 16
Issue 3 Issue 3 - June 1963

Article 9

6-1963

Commercial Transactions and Personal Property -- 1962
Tennessee Survey
John A. Spanoale

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
John A. Spanoale, Commercial Transactions and Personal Property -- 1962 Tennessee Survey, 16
Vanderbilt Law Review 637 (1963)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol16/iss3/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Commercial Transactions and
Personal Property-1962 Tennessee Survey
John A. Spanogle, Jr.*
I. COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS

I.

PERSONAL PROPERTY

A. Implied Bailment Warranties
B. Forfeitureof Property for Illegal Use
I.

CoMmERCIAL TRANSACTIONS

There were no reported cases in either bills and notes or sales for
the year 1962.' This, however, is the lull before the storm. The 1963
Tennessee Legislature adopted the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as U.C.C. or the Code] which redrafts the statutory law
in both of these areas.2 Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. replace the
Negotiable Instruments Law,3 which is repealed, as the law applicable
to bills and notes. Article 2 replaces the Uniform Sales Act,4 which
is also repealed, as the applicable statute in the sales field. The Code
was drafted and supported by the same organization which had
previously drafted the N.I.L. and the Sales Act. It was designed to
modernize the prior statutes, to codify much of the present case-law
gloss on these statutes, to provide rules to cover problems and situations not touched by either the present statutes or presently decided
cases, and to intergrate the various statutory laws concerning the
commercial transaction. The Code was also, in part, a revision of the
present uniform laws on commercial transactions and changes some
well-known concepts, especially in sales and sales financing. The
changes in bills and notes are relatively minor, however, and concern
details only.
The Code attempts to regulate all facets of the commercal transaction and, when it becomes effective, repeals all prior statutes in the
areas it covers. Thus, in Tennessee, in addition to the N.I.L. and the
*Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. But see Part II (A) infra for developments in the law of implied warranties of
bailment which may affect implied warranties in sales contracts.
2. At least 23 other states have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter
cited at U.C.C.]. For a list of these states, see 31 U.S.L. WEEK (1963). See also
31 id. at 2652.
3. Chapters 1 through 5 of title 47, TENN. CODE ANN. (1956).
4. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1201 thru -1277 (1956).
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Sales Act, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,5 local legislation on
bulk sales,6 and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act 7 are repealed in
favor of articles 6, 7, and 8 of the U.C.C. The Uniform Trust
Receipts Act,8 and local legislation on conditional sales, 9 chattel
mortgages, 10 factors liens," and assignments of accounts receivable 12
are also repealed in favor of the Code's comprehensive regulation of
secured transactions in article 9. The Code will also provide statutory
rules on letters of credit (article 5) and bills of lading (article 7)
which are not covered by any previous statutes.
The Code, and its repealer provisions, will not become effective in
Tennessee until June 30, 1964. This delay gives the practicing attorney fifteen months to become familiar with its provisions. This
amount of time will be needed for such education, for the Code is a
very large and detailed piece of legislation, 3 and little has been
written comparing the present Tennessee law to the Code.14 It is not
the purpose of this article to attempt to summarize the effect of the
provisions of this legislation on the present Tennessee law, but only to
give notice that it has been enacted and will change some of the
present rules. In 1952, the Tennessee Law Review published a series
of student notes comparing the Code and most of the Tennessee law
it will affect, but the consideration was not very detailed. 15 The
Vanderbilt Law Review has also published an article by this author,
which considers in some detail the provisions of the Code which affect
the bank-depositor relationship (article 4 of the U.C.C. ).16 It is to be
hoped that both of these law reviews will publish further information
giving detailed treatment of the effect of this new law.
II. PERSONAL PROPERTY

A. Implied Bailment Warranties
In Redmon v. U-Haul Co.,1 7 a family had rented a covered moving
van to move furniture from one town to another. The van was not
5. TENN. CODE ANN. §847-901 thru -964 (1956).
6. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1401 thru -1403 (1956).

7. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1001 thru -1024 (1956).
8. TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 47-1001 thru -1020 (1956).
9. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1301 thru -1313 (1956).

10. TENN. CODE ANN. 88 64-901 thru -912 (1956).
11. TENN. CODE ANN. §§47-1101 thru -1104 (1956).
12. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1801 thru -1804 (1956).
13. The bill, as introduced in the Tennessee Legislature, is 2.31 printed pages long.

14. This is true in spite of the fact that the published version of the U.C.C. with
comments provides cross-indexes from each section of the prior uniform laws to the
appropriate section of the U.C.C.
15. 22 TENN. L. REV. 776-872 (1953).

16. Spanogle, The Bank-Depositor Relationship-A Comparison of the Present Tennessee Law and the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 VAND. L. Rtv. 79 (1962).
17. 358 S.W.2d 300 (Tenn. 1962).
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-watertight, and during the trip rainwater leaked into it and damaged
the furniture. The family sued the lessor for breach of an implied
warranty of fitness for the purpose of moving furniture. The trial
court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, thus denying recovery,
and the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed.
The affirmance could have been on four possible grounds: 1) The
bailment contract created no implied warranty of fitness; 2) The van
was fit for moving furniture, even though it was not watertight; 3)
The van was unfit, but the conduct of the parties prevented the
warranty from arising because plaintiff had made an inspection; or
4) The van was unfit, but the warranty was effectively disclaimed.
From the opinion, however, it is not possible to determine which of
these theories the court adopted. Each of the last three is mentioned,
but none seems determinative of the case. It is clear that "there was
no implied warranty that this vehicle was waterproof," and perhaps
there were three alternative grounds for the holding. At least some
of these grounds do not seem sufficient by themselves to preclude
recovery, and so an examination of each ground is necessary.
The first problem for the court was whether a warranty of fitness
was to be implied into a bailment for hire contract. Many cases,
including Tennessee cases, have stated that bailment contracts create
implied warranties of quality, and this seems to be a generally accepted proposition. 18 The court in this case does not directly answer
this first question on whether such warranties are to be implied into
bailment contracts. There is language which could mean that no such
obligation may be read into the contract, 19 but the reasoning in the
opinion indicates otherwise. If no such warranty obligations were
imposed upon bailors, there would be no need to discuss the alternafive grounds involving the scope of the warranty, inspection, and the
disclaimer. However, these alternative grounds were discussed,
indicating by a negative implication that the warranty arose.20
The real problem arises in defining what is meant by "warranty"
in this context. At common law, there were two viewpoints: 1) that
a warrantor was an insurer against all defects covered by the warranty; and 2) that the warrantor was bound merely to exercise due
18. See cases cited in 6 Am. Jun. Bailments § 190 (1950); Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 854
(1959). For Tennessee cases, see, e.g., Vaughn v. Millington Motor Co., 160 Tenn. 197,
22 S.W.2d 226 (1929); Hilton v. Wagner, 10 Tenn. App. 173 (E.S. 1928).
19. "There is no provision in this rental contract that in any way states or implies
that the lessor warrants its moving vans to be waterproof." 358 S.W.2d at 301.
"[T]here was no implied warranty that this vehicle was waterproof." Id. at 302.
Note that this language expressly eliminates only an implied warranty that it was
waterproof, not all implied warranties.
20. Some of the court's language also supports this conclusion. "[W]hatever
implied warranty might exist in this situation would not extend to the described
defects." Id. at 301.
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care in placing goods on the market, so that he did not warrant
against latent defects.21 The Sales Act2 determined that the insurer
theory applies in all sales transactions, but the question is still open
in transactions not covered by the act, such as bailments. Again, the
court does not answer the question directly, but there is a strong implication that the insurer theory is to be used. The question of
liability is discussed without any reference to any use of due care by
the bailor, or to any lack thereof. Such reasoning implies that the
bailor would have been liable, regardless of due care, if the warranty
validly covered the defect.
Prior Tennessee cases have recognized the difference between the
two theories and have broadly stated that the sales law analogy is to
control bailment situations. "The contractual obligation of the bailor
rests upon principles applicable to contracts of sale."2 The minimum
that this language can mean is that the insurer theory, not the due
care theory, applies to bailment warranties. The silence of the court
on this point in the present case should not be deemed to overrule
its prior pronouncement. The court's earlier pronouncement could
also mean that the sales analogy determines the scope of the bailment
warranty and inspection and disclaimer problems. Such a rule would
have been very beneficial, since the policy reasons for implying
warranties are the same in each case,2 4 and because the rights of the
parties would be more definitely established. If such a result were
intended by that language, however, its possibility has been virtually
eliminated by the court's manner of consideration of such problems in
the Redmon case.

The next question was to determine the nature and scope of the
warranty. If the van was fit for the purpose of moving furniture,
there was no breach of the implied warranty. The court seems to
have considered the point, and found the van fit.
There is no contention in this case that this moving van was unfit to
transport personal property. Whether the moving van would leak in a

heavy rain would merely diminish its convenience and appropriateness for
21. 1 WrLrsToN, SALES §§ 233, 237 (1948 ed.); 26 COLum. L. REv. 744, 748
(1926).
22. UNIFORm SALEs Ac'r § 15, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1215 (1956). This rule will

be continued under the U.C.C. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, -315.
23. Vaughn v. Millington Motor Co., supra note 18, at 200, 22 S.W.2d at 227.
24. For a detailed comparison of the policies affecting the implication of warranties
in both types of transactions, see Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in NonSales Cases, 57 COLJm. L. REV. 653, 654, 667 (1957); 2 VAry. L. Rnv. 675 (1949);
and 26 CoLTJm. L. REv. 744 (1926). All three commentators agree that the policies
involved are the same in both fields, so that the law of implied warranty of bailments
should be patterned after sales law.
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the use designed, and whatever implied warranty
might exist in this situa5

tion would not extend to the described defects.2

No authority is given for these statements. Yet, in a prior case, an
automobile seller was held to have breached the implied warranties
of quality in a sales contract when he sold an automobile which
leaked.2 This must mean that a scope of warranties of quality is
different in sales and in bailment contracts.27 If this is so, then the court
is in part abandoning its earlier statement that one should be based
upon the principle applicable to the other;m and it should say so.
Without such differentiation, the bailment case might be thought to
overrule the prior sales decision. Also, knowing the reasons for making
this distinction would be helpful in defining the scope of implied
bailment warranties under any non-analogous rule.
The third line of reasoning used by the court is that the bailee, by
having had an opportunity to inspect and having failed to discover
the defect, was precluded from asserting the breach. The court quoted
Amercan Jurisprudenceand stated that since plaintiffs had an opportunity to inspect both before and during the rain, no warranty could
be implied. Again, an implied sales warranty would have been
decided the other way.2 First, the language of the Sales Act requires
that there be an actual examination, not just an opportunity to inspect.3 0 Second, since the warranty is created or not at the time of the
sales contract, the opportunity to inspect after the contract and during
the rain would have been irrelevant. Third, an inspection limits the
sales warranty only as regards apparent defects and has no effect on
warranties against latent defects. 3' The court did not discuss whether
the defect was latent or apparent. The court therefore seems to have
laid down a rule for bailment warranties that an opportunity to inspect, either before or after the creation of the bailment, destroys any
implied warranty as to any apparent or latent defect. Yet this is
25. 358 S.W.2d at 301.
26. Kohn v. Ball, 36 Tenn. App. 281, 254 S.W.2d 755 (W.S. 1952).
27. In Kohn, recovery was based on an implied warranty of merchantability, not on
an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. Id. at 286, 254 S.W.2d at
757. The warranty of fitness was found inapplicable, however, solely because no
particular purpose was involved, but only the general purpose of motoring. In this
state, "a particular purpose" for warranty protection must be unordinary. Compare
U.C.C. § 2-313(2c) with U.C.C. § 2-314, comment 2. Defects affecting use for
ordinary purposes relate to merchantability. This distinction should not have affected
the court's analysis of the present case, however. It seems accepted that moving
furniture is a particular purpose.
28. See text at note 23 supra.
29. See, e.g., Kohn v. Ball, supra note 25, at 287, 254 S.W.2d at 758.
30. U~ironm SALEs AcT § 15(3), TFNN. CoDE AN~rN. § 47-1215(3) (1956). The
effect of inspection on sales warranties is even more limited under the U.C.C. See comment 13 to § 2-314 of the U.C.C.
31. ibid.
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tantamount to saying that there are no implied warranties in a bailment for hire contract, for such an opportunity will always be avail-

able if the subject of the bailment is ever used by the bailee. Thus,
it is suggested that the court overreached itself and may wish to
reconsider its broad language. Again, it is suggested that the rules
applicable to a sales contract could appropriately be used by analogy
in this situation since the reasons for implying warranties are the
same in each case. 32
The fourth line of reasoning used by the court is that the warranty
was expressly disclaimed. A clause in the bailment contract read: "Lessee agrees to assume liability for any and all damage to personal

property transported in said truck, including damage caused by fire,
water, theft or collision."33 This clause was held, without discussion,

sufficient to exclude recovery of rain damage. This holding does not
seem to conform to prior Tennessee cases on disclaimer clauses in sales
34
contracts, especially the case of General Motors Corp. v. Dodson.
There, an express disclaimer of all implied warranties was ignored in

the sale of an automobile.

Whether such disclaimers are ignored on

public policy grounds or not,0 6 they have always been strictly con-

strued against the authorA' Thus, the clause could have been given a
limited construction that it only disclaimed water damage caused by

third parties or accidents, for which the bailor is not responsible, not
defects in the van itself, responsibility for which may be traced to the
bailor. Such a construction, using the principle of ejusdem generis,
would have been in conformance with the rest of the language in the
clause: "fife ... theft or collision."- The court did not, however, so
32. See note 24 supra.
33. 358 S.W.2d at 300.
34. 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (M.S. 1960).
35. Id. at 450-51, 338 S.W.2d at 659. See Bass, Personal Property and Sales-1961
Tennessee Survey, 14 VAN. L. REv. 1349, 1350 (1961); 14 V.ND. L. REv. 681 (1961).
36. Public policy grounds have been used in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); and State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. AndersonWeber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449 (1961). The Dodson court did not
spell out its grounds for ignoring the disclaimer.
37. Roberts Distrib. Co. v. Kaye-Halbert Corp., 126 Cal. App. 2d 386, 272 P.2d 886,
889 (1956); Wade v. Chariot Trailer Co., 331 Mich. 576, 50 N.W.2d 162 (1951);
D & W Co. v. Moch, 71 N.D. 649, 3 N.W.2d 471 (1942); Henningsen v. Bloornfield
Motors, supra note 36, and authorities cited therein.
38. For an example of an analogous division of responsibility in the face of
equally broad language, see the maritime cases involving "all risks" insurance. The
cases are collected in Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1122 (1963). There, in spite of the
comprehensive coverage in the expressed language (comparable to the language of the
disclaimer clause), inherent defects in the goods shipped are not covered (comparable to
damages due to defects in the bailed goods present at the time of bailment), because
"the purpose of the policy is to secure indemnity against accidents which may happen." Gulf Transp. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 121 Miss. 655, 83 So. 730, 733
(1940). The same purpose, to disclaim liability against accidents which may happen,
is shown in the present case by the language "fire . . . theft, or collision." The
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construe the clause. Instead, the broadest possible construction was
given-that it was a disclaimer of implied warranty on all water
damage, regardless of the source, or responsibility over the source,
of the damage. Further, the court cited the American Jurisprudence
section on sales as authority for its holdings.3 This raises the possibility that the court is willing to regard disclaimers in sales contracts
more favorably also. A definite answer to that problem must await
the decision of a case involving a sales contract, however.
At first glance, the Redmon case does not seem objectionable. The
court has many arguments for its decision, and all seem feasible. On
further analysis, however, the case creates many problems in both
the field of bailments and in sales. In bailments, it is fairly certain
that some warranty of quality is implied into a bailment contract,
but its nature and scope are not known. It is probably not comparable to similar warranties in sales contracts, unless the law of such
sales warranties has been drastically changed from prior decisions.
This failure to use the available sales law analogy is unfortunate,
because the policy considerations for imposing the warranties are
similar in both cases, and because any non-analogous rule is so
uncertain.40 This bailment implied warranty, whatever its scope may
be, may have been effectively withdrawn by the court's enunciated
inspection doctrine. But there are adequate methods of retreat open,
whether the court reads the language of American Jurisprudencemore
closely or adopts a viewpoint more adapted to present commercial
practice. Finally, disclaimers of implied warranties may be very
broadly construed in bailment contracts. In sales, the primary question is whether the pronouncements in the present case may be
used by analogy to overturn or modify present law. This danger is
present most clearly in construction of disclaimer clauses, but it is
also present in defining the quality required by a warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose.
B. Forfeiture of Property for Illegal Use
In United States v. One CadillacHardtop Automobile,4 1 the federal
principle has not been limited to maritime cases. Chute v. North River Ins. Co., 172
Minn. 13, 214 N.W. 473 (1927).
39. 46 Am. Jur. Sale § 333 (1943), cited 358 S.W.2d at 301. There is no discussion of disclaimers in the American Jurisprudence sections on bailments, so the
court was forced to consult sales law if it used American Jurisprudence for authority.
This does not satisfactorily explain why American Jurisprudence should control prior
Tennessee reported decisions.
Under the U.C.C., an express statutory provision will govern the effect of disclaimers.
See U.C.C. § 2-316. This will not, however, solve all problems of construing particular
language.
40. See authorities cited in note 24 supra.
41. 207 F. Supp. 693 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
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government filed a libel for the forfeiture of an automobile which
had been used to transport narcotics illegally. The vendor of the car
intervened on the ground that it had a lien on the automobile for the
unpaid part of the purchase price and that this fact should entitle it
to a remission of the forfeiture to the extent of the lien. The intervenor alleged that it had acted in good faith and, after investigation,
had had no knowledge of any likely or proposed illegal use; and the
United States did not dispute this allegation. This fact did not, however, allow the lienholder to obtain mitigation of the court's forfeiture
order.
The federal district court first found that the automobile had been
used to transport narcotics illegally, in spite of the fact that the users
of the car had been acquitted on some of the counts in a criminal
action based on the same evidence. 42 The car was therefore forfeited.
The court then found that it had jurisdiction to remit such forfeitures
only when a common carrier or a stolen car were involved. 3 The lienholder had argued that, although this was the only express statutory
jurisdiction granted, it was not exclusive. The lienholder sought to
incorporate, by a general reference, the provisions relating to the
violations of the alcohol tax laws of the Internal Revenue Code.44
The Revenue Code provisions allow judicial remission in other circumstances. This contention was rejected, however. The libel was
brought under a chapter of the Transportation Code,45 and one section
of that chapter specifically states that the provisions of the customs
laws46 shall apply to forfeitures under the chapter. The Revenue

Code provisions are therefore specifically inapplicable, and the
customs
laws do not provide for general judicial remissions of forfei47
tures.

This holding is in agreement with the prior decisions.4 8 The

42. The libel was submitted on the basis of the testimony in the earlier criminal
trial. In the libel action, once the United States established "probable cause for seizing
the automobile," the burden of proof was on the claimants-the owner of the car and
the lienholder-to prove that the car bad not been used illegally. 46 Stat. 757 (1930),
as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1958). In the criminal case, the Government was
required to prove the defendants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. With these different
standards of proof, it was not impossible to have different verdicts.
43. 53 Stat. 1291 (1939), 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1958). These are the only situations in
which judicial remission is expressly allowed by the chapter under which the libel
was brought.
44. INT. 1Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 7301. The incorporation was attempted through a
reference in 53 Stat. 1292 (1939), 49 U.S.C. § 786 (1958).
45. U.S.C. tit. 49 (1958).
46. U.S.C. tit. 19 (1958). The Internal Revenue Code is contained in title 26
of the United States Code.
47. See 46 Stat. 757 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1958).
48. See. e.g., United States v. Andrade, 181 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1950); United
States v. One 1941 Plymouth Sedan, 153 F.2d 19 (10th Cir. 1946); United States v.
One 1952 Buick Auto, 136 F. Supp. 253 (D. Minn. 1955).
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provisions allowing judicial remission in alcohol tax cases seem to be
an exception to the general statutory scheme. The courts have always
regarded them as such and have shown no inclination to extend this
exception to other types of forfeitures. 49
This statutory scheme does not, however, deprive the lienholder of
all ability to obtain remission of the forfeiture. The court intimated
that, if there were such a deprivation, "some constitutional violation
may exist."50 Instead of seeking judicial remission, the lienholder
should seek administrative relief through an application to the attorney general.51 Such relief is to be granted whenever the attorney
general finds that the "forfeiture was incurred without willful negligence or without any intention on the part of petitioner to defraud
the revenue or to violate the law."52 Thus, if the lienholder can prove
the facts alleged to the satisfaction of the administrative official, he
should be able to obtain a remission to the extent of his lien. It is
to be noted, however, that such relief is discretionary with the administrative official and, even though probably not reviewable in the
courts, 53 is the sole relief available to this lienholder.
49. Ibid.
50. 207 F. Supp. at 699. The constitutional violation referred to is a "taking of
private property for public use without fair compensation." Id. at 698.
51. The statutory scheme of the customs laws provides for discretionary remission
by the secretary of the treasury. 46 Stat. 757 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1958).
This power has been transferred to the attorney general. Exec. Order No. 6166. See 5
U.S.C. §§ 124-132 and note (1958).
52. 46 Stat. 757 (1930), 19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1958).
53. United States v. Gramling, 180 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1950); United States v. One
1951 Cadillac Coupe De Ville, 108 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Penn. 1952).

